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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
Department Editors....
ROBERT KINGsLEY
.................... I SAUL N. RITTENBERG
OPINION
AIRPORTS-AUTHORITY OF MUNICIPALITY TO ERECT POLES AND HIGH LINES

Your letter
CORPORATE LIMYITS TO LIGHT AIRPORT.-[Minnesota]
addressed to Attorney General ............ , under date of December 20, 1934,
has been referred to the undersigned for reply.
Therein you state that the City of Alexandria has a municipal light plant;
that about a year ago, the city leased land outside of the city limits for an
airport and is now "furnishing the electricity needed to light the airport
without charge, same being outside of tlhe corporate limits."
You also direct attention to Chapter 55, Extra Session Laws of 1933-34
relating to the establishment of airports in villages of a certain class. Section 1 of said Chapter 55 provides as follows:
OUTSIDE

"Every village of this state, situated in counties having an assessed
valuation of not more than $2,000,000.00 and a population of not more than
5,000 inhabitants is hereby authorized by resolution of the council to establish
and maintain a municipal flying field and airport, to acquire land by lease,
gift, purchase, * * *."
You inquire:
"Does that refer to the value and population of the
village or county?"
We are of the opinion that the words "assessed valuation of not more
than $2,000,000.00 and a population of not more than 5,000 inhabitants" refer
to the valuation and population of the county or counties coming within
said classification, rather than the valuation of the village or villages coming
within such classification.
You also inquire: "Does the governing body of the municipality or the
Board charged with the operation of a public light plant have the authority
to erect poles and high lines outside of the corporate limits of the municipality without the voters' sanction?"
You do not indicate by your second question whether you have reference
to the City of Alexandria, or to some other village in your county. We
assume from the statement of facts in your communication that you have
reference to the City of Alexandria.
You do not so state, but our information is that the City of Alexandria
is one of the fourth class operating under a home rule charter, adopted in
1909. It is possible that the City of Alexandria has the power to erect such
high line outside of the corporate limits of the city without submitting such
proposition to a vote of the electors. However, even if the city does not
have the power to erect and operate such line, under the terms of its home
rule charter, we believe that it has such power under Chapter 217, Laws 1929.
Said Chapter 217 applies to all cities and villages throughout the state,
except cities of the first class. Section 1 of said chapter provides as follows:
"The governing body of any city, village, or town in this state is hereby
authorized to acquire, establish, construct, own, control, lease, equip, improve,
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maintain, operate, and regulate airports or landing fields for the use of
airplanes and other aircraft either within or without the limits of such
cities, villages, and towns, and may use for such purpose or purposes any
property suitable therefor that is now or may at any time hereafter be
controlled by such city, village, or town."
Section 5 of said Chapter 217 provides, in part, as follows:
"The governing body of any city, village, town, or county which has established an airport or landing field * * * may construct, improve, equip, maintain,
and operate the same, or may vest jurisdiction for the construction, improvement, equipment, maintenance, and operation thereof, in any suitable office,
board, or body of such city, village, town, or county. The expenses of such
construction, improvement, equipment, maintenance, and operation shall be a
city, village, town, or county charge as the case may be. * * *"
It is apparent from the above quoted portions of said Chapter 217 that
any city or village in this state has the power to acquire, establish, construct,
improve, equip, maintain and operate an airport or landing field either within
or without the corporate limits of a city or village without submitting the
proposition, as to whether such field shall be established and maintained,
to a vote of the electors of such municipality. We take it that the erection
and extension of poles and high lines of the corporate limits of the city to
which you refer in your communication was for the purpose of lighting
said airport, and we believe that the language of said Chapter 217, Laws
1929 is sufficiently broad to authorize such city or village to so erect such
poles and high lines outside of the corporate limits of such municipality
for the purpose of lighting such airport, without submitting such proposition
to a vote of the electors.
You further inquire:
Can Chapter 55, Session 1934, be construed to
authorize the construction of a high line outside of the corporate limits of
the municipality for the purpose of equipping a flying field with lights?"
You do not so state, but we assume that "the municipality" to which
you refer in your third question is the City of Alexandria. As hereinabove
indicated, said Chapter 55, Extra Session Laws 1933-34 applies only to
villages coming within the class referred to in said chapter. In other words,
said Chapter 55 does not apply to cities. However, we believe that said
Chapter 55 is sufficiently broad to authorize a village coming within the
class to which said chapter refers to construct and maintain a high line
outside of the corporate limits of such village or villages for the purpose
of equipping a village flying field with lights. Even if such village does
not have the power to construct and maintain such high line for such
purpose, under said Chapter 55, as indicated in our answer to your second
question, we believe that villages throughout the state have the power to
construct and maintain such line or lines for the purpose of lighting village
airports, pursuant to said Chapter 217, Laws 1929. The latter act is a
general act applying to all cities and villages throughout the state, except
cities of the first class. (Opinion of the Attorney General, December 27
1934).
DIGESTS
AIR
Petition
District
Court.

MAIL-CANCELLATION OF CONTRACTs-REMEDY AT LAw.-[Federal]
for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
of Columbia denied, April 1, 1935, by the United States Supreme
Pacific Air Transport v. Farley, 55 S. Ct. 637.
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For opinion below, see -

F. (2d) -;

for digest of case see 6

JOURNAL

OF AIR LAW 289 (1935).
LORRAINE ARNOLD.

AIR MAIL-CANCELLATION OF CONTRACTS-REMEDY AT LAw.-[Federal]
This case is controlled by the opinion and decree in National Air Transport,
Inc. v. Farley, App. D. C. 75 F. (2d) 765, and associated cases (see
6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 289) decided and filed concurrently with this case,
in which the decree was affirmed with costs. Pennsylvania Airlines, Inc. v.
Farley, 75 F. (2d) 769 (decided Feb. 4, 1935, by the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia).
LORRAINE ARNOLD.
MECHANICS'
LIENS-BAILMENTS-MASTER
AND
SERVANT.-[Oklahoma]
The action was instituted by plaintiff to recover a money judgment and to
establish and foreclose a lien upon a certain airplane, and to have the same
sold to satisfy said judgment. An intervening petition was filed on behalf
of the chattel mortgagee, claiming a first and prior lien. The defendant,
owner of the airplane, had hired plaintiff to act both as pilot and mechanic.
Plaintiff did, and caused to be done by other mechanics, work and labor on
said plane, which was charged to him, and purchased considerable gasoline
and oil, amounting in all to several hundred dollars. Judgment below for
plaintiff for the sum of $985.52 and also imposing a first and prior lien on
said airplane in favor of plaintiff. Held: Affirmed in part, and reversed in
part. The plaintiff, being the servant of defendant, was not "lawfully in
possession" within the applicable statute creating the lien. Plaintiff's possession of the airplane was the possession of his employer. The gasoline and
oil furnished at plaintiff's expense would not create a lien within the
statute which restricts such a lien to "service by labor and skill." Since
materials clearly do not fall within the latter description, the money judgment was affirmed, but the part of the judgment imposing a lien in favor of
the plaintiff was reversed: Jones v. Bodkin, 44 P. (2d) 38 (Supreme Court
of Oklahoma, April 23, 1935).
B. W. HEINEMAN.

NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO GUEST PASSENGER-RES IPSA LoQUITUR.-[Arkansas] Plaintiff's intestate, with another, was riding as a guest in the
airplane owned and piloted by W. N. Gregory and his son on a trip from
Augusta, Arkansas to St. Louis, Missouri.
At a point in Illinois, some
distance out of St. Louis, the airplane crashed and was destroyed by fire,
all four occupants therein being instantly killed. Plaintiff, as administratrix
of the estate of Herndon, instituted action against defendant as executrix
of the estate of W. N. Gregory and administratrix of W. N. Gregory, Jr.,
the complaint alleging that death was caused by the negligence of the airplane owner and pilot, and that the exact character of the negligence which
caused the crash was unknown to plaintiff, but that W. N. Gregory was
especially negligent in causing said death in that his son was known to him
to be an unskilled pilot and this fact was not known to plaintiff's intestate.
From a judgment dismissing the complaint, after sustaining the demurrer,
plaintiff appeals. Held: affirmed. The complaint did not state a cause of
action and was properly demurrable unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applied. The doctrine was inapplicable here since no presumption of negligence arises from the mere fact of injury, when that fact is as consistent
with the presumption that it was unavoidable as it is with negligence. In
order to give rise to the res ipsa doctrine the complaint should have alleged
some particular act of negligence or some fact over which human conduct
had control. Herndon v. Gregory, 81 S. W. (2d) 849 (Supreme Court of
Arkansas, decided April 22, 1935; dissent filed May 13, 1935, 82 S. W. (2d)

244).
LORRAINE ARNOLD.

